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SOLLY ROBINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN MINNESOTA
Leo F. Feeneyt
At the turn of the twentieth century, American corporations
had attained great wealth due, in part, to benefits conferred by the
government, whether it be government grants, tax breaks, trade
preferences or direct government spending designed to make life
easier for corporate entities. It was an article of faith that what is
good for business is good for America. In the 1950's flourishing
corporate entities were producing new products for consumers at
an astonishing pace. The quest for market share resulted in many
products that had not been properly tested or accompanied by
adequate information easily reaching the market place. Media advertising tended to glamorize these products and obscure their unsafe qualities. The average consumer almost universally accepted
the assumptions and representations contained in these slick promotional materials. Consequently, many of these products were
purchased by consumers with little or no understanding of their
inherent dangers.
At the same time, there was an accelerating imbalance between
the protections the law was affording to the manufacturers of these
products and ordinary consumers. Both courts and legislators,
since the turn of the century, believed in aiding the growth of
manufacturing and commerce and were reluctant to support individual claims against commercial entities. Consequently, controlling legislation and court decisions failed to place injured consumers on a more equal footing in actions brought against the
manufacturer of dangerous products. In the year 1963, prevailing
law greatly favored the manufacturer at the expense of the consumer. Meritorious claims by consumers, at that time, were regularly being denied on the basis of a wide range of legal theories in-

t Leo F. Feeney is a partner at the law firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller and
Ciresi, practicing in the areas of personal injury and products liability.
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cluding caveat emptor, lack of privity, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the always asserted allegation that "the hazard
was not foreseen." These legal barricades, which gready benefitted
the purveyors of products at the expense of the ordinary consumer,
were extremely difficult obstacles to overcome on behalf of an injured victim.
It was against this historical background that Solly Robins was
to test his belief that these significant hurdles to recovery by consumers required re-examination in these "more modern times."
Throughout his legal career, as of 1963, he had been forced to deal
with a system inclined to shift responsibilities to injured consumers
while holding less accountable the makers of dangerous products.
There was no incentive for manufacturers to change their ways.
Robins, a great student of the law, who frequently did his own
legal research, had great faith in the common law and believed that
some day the common law would "catch-up" with the needs of this
more modern society. Support for this proposition, he believed,
was evident in the observations of three distinguished jurists of that
era. These observations are contained in the matter of Dalehite v.
United States.' In his office, Solly Robins kept close at hand a copy
of this decision and the dissent authored by Justice RobertJackson.
Joining in the dissent were Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo
Black. The reasoning and observations of these three distinguished
jurists in the dissent had a great impact on Robins and fueled his
belief that other courts would eventually adopt the philosophy so
well articulated by Justice Jackson. Set forth is a passage from the
Dalehite dissent that Robins would most often quote:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing
extent our population is dependent upon mass producers
for its food and drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no longer are natural or simple
products but complex ones whose composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society must exact
greater care than in more simple days and must require
from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and
caution as the only protection of its safety and well-being.
Purchasers cannot try out drugs to determine whether
they kill or cure. Consumers cannot test the youngster's
cowboy suit or the wife's sweater to see if they are apt to
burst into fatal flames. Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot
1Dalehite

v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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experiment with the combustibility of goods in transit.
Where experiment or research is necessary to determine
the presence or the degree of danger, the product must
not be tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge
to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The
claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to
one who did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise 2
Ten years later, Justice Jackson's compelling philosophy was
delivered by Solly Robins to a Ramsey County jury during his final
summation in the matter of McCormack v. Hankscraft. Andrea
McCormack was a young girl who had been severely burned by an
electric steam vaporizer manufactured by the Hankscraft Company.
The McCormack family, prior to retaining Robins, had previously
been advised by other counsel that they were not likely to prevail in
the matter. Notwithstanding the opinion held by other counsel
Robins sensed, based in large part upon the dissent in Dalehite, that
the basic criteria by which courts determine liability in the case of
harmful products was slowly evolving and that the time was ripe for
the courts to adopt the reasoning of Justice Jackson in Dalehite.
Robins strongly felt that the consequences of the manufacturer's failure to make its product safe for its intended use should
not be borne by the innocent victim or society but ratherby the defendant
manufacturer. Convinced that he was right on both counts he undertook the representation of Andrea McCormack. At the conclusion of the submission of the evidence, he set forth in his argument
to the jury his beliefs on deterrence, and who should best bear the
consequences of injuries when a defective product is being used as
it was intended to be used. He presented his argument on these
issues with a series of rhetorical questions each designed to make
his point. He urged the jurors to consider the following factors:
Should this defendant corporation be found guiltless
and without fault in this case there would be no deterrent
to manufacturing [such items] for profit regardless of
consequences. Why should this defendant corporation be
held blameless when it warranted that its product was safe
It ill behooves the defendant
and practically foolproof ....
to try to avoid liability by stating "It's somebody else's fault
2

Id. at 52.
'McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
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-They shouldn't have used it if it was a dangerous product." Now let us look at that frankly and candidly. Should
defendant avoid liability even though its product was being used exactly as it was intended to be used? Should
people buy defendant's product and not use it?....
Who is to bear the consequence of [the manufacturer's]
failure to make it a safe product? Society? The parents?
The public? Or, the defendant corporation? The answer
is self-evident... Defendant corporation has filled its brochure with quiet and persuasive assurances... Judgment in
this case.. .reduces itself to a consideration of whether or
not defendant corporation should be held responsible for
its failure to produce a product that was not defective in
normal use, or, put another way, that was not fit for the
purpose for which it was intended to be used.
He repeatedly in his summation presented the jury with the
logical extension of the manufacturing defenses: "Should people buy
defendant's product and not use it?" The Supreme Court of Minnesota
clearly understood the validity and truth of his arguments and consequently adopted the law of strict liability. Robins believed passionately in the philosophy articulated by Justice Jackson in Dalehite.
He believed passionately it was time for the common law to "catch
up" with the ways and perils of a more modern society. As a result
of his efforts on behalf of Andrea McCormack, the reasoning of the
dissent in Dalehite eventually found expression in Minnesota law
and Minnesota courtrooms.
In a speech delivered at a jurisprudence award dinner in Minneapolis on May 18, 1995, some 32 years after the McCormack v.
Hankscraft decision, Robins quoted from the words of George Bernard Shaw: "The worst of sins toward our fellow creatures is not to
hate them, but to be indifferent to them: that is the essence of inhumanity." It was the corporate indifference he saw directed at an
innocent little girl disabled for life, that motivated him to take the
Hankscraft case. On that same occasion he went on to reassert his
belief in his profession and in the common law:
[W] e [lawyers] should affirmatively and steadfastly institute and promote programs to restore our besieged and
falsely assailed profession to its rightful dignity as a noble
profession, remedying all wrongs and injuries without limit and
unfettered by unfair, unconstitutionally contrived laws and statutes which are sponsored and supported by commercial
groups....

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/30

4

2000]

SOLLY
ROBINS
Feeney: Solly Robins and the
Development
of Products Liability Law in Min

735

Solly Robins, was not anti-business but he was always on guard
against becoming a mere servant of businesses. He was dedicated
to the ideal of lawyers using their time and talents through the
common law to shape a just society.
Those of us who had the opportunity to work with him in this
area of the law were touched by his passion and compassion for the
common person and his constant striving to remedy the imbalance
between the great corporation and the ordinary citizen. We were
inevitably enriched by his constant striving to fight for improvements in the law and to eliminate deficiencies in the administration
ofjustice.
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